Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 3

Article 14

1996

Assessing Hospital Cooperation Laws
James F. Blumstein
Prof., Vanderbilt University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
James F. Blumstein Assessing Hospital Cooperation Laws, 8 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 248 (1996).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol8/iss3/14

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

FEATURE

ARTICLE

Assessing Hospital Cooperation
Laws
by James F Blumstein

Introduction

titrust enforcement to assure a free and competitive marketplace.'
The primary purpose of antitrust legislation is to promote competition in the market place
in order to achieve economic efficiency and
thereby to improve the well being of consumers.6 Federal antitrust legislation prohibits conspiracies to restrain trade,7 monopolization and
attempts to monopolize,' anticompetitive exclusive dealing arrangements, 9 mergers and acquisitions that adversely affect competition, 0 unfair or deceptive practices with a significant impact on competition," and discriminatory pricing that lessens competition.' 2 Antitrust laws

How to control health care costs while
preserving the quality of care has been the focal
point of much health policy discussion at the federal and state level for many years and will doubtless continue to be of importance in the future.
Philosophically and historically, there has been
debate as to the role of market forces and competition in allocating resources in the health care
industry. Traditionally, many analysts have
viewed the health care arena as inhospitable to
the functioning of the economic marketplace. For
them, cooperation among health care providers
coupled with regulation is
an appropriate approach
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promote competition in order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources 1

-

goods and

services should be available to consumers at the
lowest price for a given quality level.
In something of a rejection of market-oriented initiatives and a throwback to the traditional regulatory approach, a number of states
recently have enacted legislation that authorizes
hospitals or health care providers to enter into
cooperative agreements. In the absence of such
legislation, cooperative agreements among competitors would be subject to federal and state
antitrust laws.' 4 While these cooperation laws
enable cooperative efforts among health care providers, 5 they permit such activity only under certain circumstances. The statutes establish elaborate schemes for securing approval, weighing,
among other factors, the possible adverse impact
of cooperative conduct on competition. State
administrators, typically health departments, are
allowed to balance the benefits claimed to be
achieved through cooperative agreements against
possible anticompetitive results. 16
This paper examines the nature of the health
care market and its evolution, explains the legal
basis for state conferral of antitrust immunity for
hospital cooperative conduct, reviews federal
antitrust hospital industry enforcement guidelines, and summarizes the hospital cooperation
laws. The paper concludes with a discussion of
the likely impact of the hospital cooperation laws
on the consumer.
The changing hospital and health care
market
The nature of competition in the health
care field and among hospitals is changing. Because of the prevalence of nearly complete third-
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party insurance coverage for hospital services,
there was very little price competition until the
early 1980s.' Due to of legislative changes that
have encouraged competition and cost control
and changes in the way health care services are
being purchased, price competition exists and
has been demonstrated in some areas of the country and seems to have emerged in many more
markets in the past few years. Studies regarding
price competition have focused on California
because data are available and a high percentage
of the population is covered by insurers who contract competitively with providers. Since ninety
million Americans are covered by HMOs and
discount medical networks,' 8 price competition
is likely to be an important market feature in other
parts of the country.
Historical background
Historically, influenced by the institutional structure and environment in which they
functioned, hospitals and the markets in which
they operate have behaved in a somewhat different manner from other industries and their markets. 9 Until recently, three participants in the
hospital market - physicians, patients and hospitals - operated in an environment in which
price was not an overriding consideration; insurance paid for treatment considered appropriate by the physician and paid at a price set by the
20
providers - the physicians and hospitals.
Among the participants in the market, physicians have been the most influential. 21 As a result of their experience and training, physicians
have a much more specialized knowledge and
expertise than patients. 22 The professional dominance model 23 has resulted from (and, in turn,
has reinforced) 24 this asymmetry of information. 25
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Under the traditional professional paradigm,
patients rely on the recommendations of their
physician. With the prevalence of third-party insurance for hospital stays, patients could receive
hospital services for relatively small out-ofpocket payments.26 Because of physicians' traditional ability to channel patients, hospitals have
been dependent on physicians to admit patients
to their facilities.27 Competition among hospitals has focused on attracting referrals of patients
by physicians. In that type of competitive environment, emphasis among competitor hospitals
is on the wishes of physicians, and neither the
hospital nor the physician in such circumstances
has much of an incentive to be responsive to considerations of cost. This general picture is still
true in many parts of the United States; in some
areas, however, payers - increasingly important, increasingly cost-conscious, and increasingly active participants in the market - exert
their influence and are changing the hospital and
28
the health care market.
Normally, increased competition in a
market can be expected to lead to greater efficiency and lower prices. 29 Early studies on the
effects of hospital competition led to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that increased competition led to higher prices. 3° This led to the
familiar "medical arms race" hypothesis, where
purchases of expensive equipment led to similar
purchases by other institutions without regard for
cost effectiveness. 3' The tradition of professional
dominance, the predominance of third-party insurance, and the overall lack of incentives for
cost consciousness meant that cost considerations were not an issue for competitive contesting among hospitals. Competition among hospitals, therefore, did not focus on price but rather
on other, non-price dimensions, as in other in250 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

dustries, such as heavily regulated industries
where the terms of competition are constrained.
Frequently, competitive activity was directed to
providing costly amenities for patients and sophisticated equipment for physicians (with the
necessary staff required to operate the equipment).32 This resulted in increased overhead for
each institution and in the unwarranted duplica33
tion of services in the marketplace.
The syllogism for competitive success was
quite straightforward. Hospitals succeeded by
filling beds. Filled beds derived from referrals,
since patients traditionally have typically been
admitted to a hospital by a physician. Physicians
controlled patient flow through control of patient
referrals. Hospitals, therefore, competed among
themselves for patients by vying for the affiliation of local physicians; 34 to gain physician affiliations, hospitals provided expensive specialized clinical services. 35 Given the structure of
the marketplace, and the existing structure of
incentives, hospitals in competitive markets face
higher costs than those without competitors. Part
of the reason for this phenomenon, apparently,
36
was the inappropriate duplication of services.
"Hospitals in monopolistic positions within their
local area produce[d] their services at significantly lower costs than hospitals in more competitive environments. 37 With payments to hospitals reflecting a cost-based system, in which
hospitals were reimbursed for their legitimate
expenditures, including capital outlays, there was
little incentive for any relevant decisionmaker
to take costs into consideration. As a result, the
hospital market seemed 38 to function differently
from other markets - greater competition cor39
related with higher rather than lower prices.
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Recent market changes
Legislative changes' combined with insurer and employer attention to health care costs4 '
have changed the dynamic of the health care industry in some parts of the United States. This
suggests that when the health care marketplace
is restructured to reflect incentives like other
markets, health care participants and markets
behave in like fashion.
In 1982, California enacted legislation (effective in 1983) that allowed health insurance
plans (private third parties and the state Medicaid program) to contract selectively with health
care providers.42 This enabled private insurance
plans and Medi-Cal (California's Medicaid program) to channel their beneficiaries to selected
providers in exchange for price and other concessions. This change introduced price competition into the California health care market as insurance plans and Medi-Cal bargained with hospitals and other providers.43 In 1983, federal legislation established the prospective payment system ("PPS") for hospitals treating Medicare patients.' Under PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed
fee for a range of defined services called diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs"). 45 Finally,
HMOs' and PPOs, a7 entities which bargain for
discounts from hospitals, grew rapidly.48 With
the introduction of cost-conscious payers into the
health care field, incentives shifted. As a result,
price competition as well as quality competition
began to emerge. 49
Data from 1980 through 1985 show that
in California the new payment policies and the
concomitant shift in economic incentives for
participants in the marketplace dramatically reduced the rate of increase in total hospital costs
and revenues and caused a shift to less expen-
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sive outpatient services. 50 About 80% of the
population of California is covered either by
Medicare (and is, therefore, subject to DRGs) or
managed care organizations (with their careful
attention to costs). Thus, hospitals now have
strong incentives to reduce costs. 5' The 198385 growth rate of hospital costs was lower than
the 1980-82 rate for all categories except for outpatient services;5 2 for hospitals in highly competitive areas, total inpatient costs (adjusted for
inflation) declined by 11.3% while remaining flat
in low-competition markets. 3 In the period from
1983 to 1988, high HMO market penetration
stimulated more price competitive behavior on
the part of traditional health insurers. When such
insurers were permitted to contract with hospitals for discounts, they did so, and that led to a
54
reduction in costs.
Thus, there is reason to think that in competitive hospital markets, when appropriately
structured, the standard economic assumption
that competition lowers prices or decreases the
price/cost margin is true. 5 A payer-driven market is characterized by the presence of purchasers who are motivated and capable 6 price shoppers.5 The influence of payors is typical in the
traditional marketplace, as payors determine the
levels (quantity and quality) of services that will
be purchased. This reflects a growing influence
of market-driven behavior and a parallel erosion
of the professional model, in which issues of
quality and style of practice are typically decisions of the professional practitioners who act
(presumably in a fiduciary capacity) on behalf
of their patients (but without incentives for con58
straining costs).
Understanding how hospital markets
function and how hospitals compete clearly has
implications for antitrust policies. If hospitals
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compete primarily in non-price ways, intensifying competition will very likely increase consumer costs and prices. 59 However, if hospitals
can be induced to compete even partially by
price, maintaining potentially competitive markets is important so that consumers may realize
the benefits of price competition.' Antitrust
enforcement will require sensitivity to distinctions between pro and anticompetitive combinations.6' It seems that existing antitrust doctrine
is well equipped to allow the drawing of those
distinctions,62 and recent evidence suggests that
the federal antitrust enforcement officials are
aware of and sensitive to these concerns.6 3
The conferral of state immunity to
federal antitrust laws
The state-enacted hospital cooperation
laws, which exempt certain cooperative agreements among hospitals or health care providers
from federal antitrust laws, are based on the
Parkerv. Brown' state-action immunity doctrine.
In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress has exercised its constitutional commerce power to the
maximum; 61 in Parker, the Supreme Court deferred to federalism' and established a form of
"inverse preemption." 67 By appropriate legislative and regulatory action, a state can immunize
the conduct of private parties from the application of the federal antitrust laws. Thus, federal
antitrust law is "subject to supersession by state
regulatory programs ' '68 that substitute regulation
for competition, provided that the state clearly
articulates its policy and actively supervises it.69
Parkerv. Brown7' concerned an antitrust
challenge to California's Raisin Proration Program, which authorized the state to appropriate
a portion of each producer's output in order to
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stabilize raisin prices. This was a clear effort by
the state to restrict competition among raisin
growers", yet the Court found no violation of
the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the
Sherman Act prohibited individual action, not
state action." Even though the California program would have violated the antitrust laws "if
it were organized and made effective solely" by
collective action of "private persons," the
Sherman Act does not "restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature."73 Therefore, the California program
does not apply "to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States 'as an act of government.'" 74
In CaliforniaLiquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 5 the Court clarified the

requirements for a state to confer antitrust immunity successfully on a private party.76 Two

standards must be satisfied. First, the challenged
restraint must be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy;7 7 in this regard,

a state policy which permits but does not compel anticompetitive conduct can be considered
"clearly articulated."78 Second, the policy must
be actively supervised by the state itself.79 Actual80 and not just potential8 supervision by the
state is required.82 Hence, with respect to private
conduct, "there is a real danger that [the private
party] is acting to further [its] own interests,
rather than the governmental interests of the
State, 83 the state must "exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct
....The mere presence of some state involve' 84
ment or monitoring does not suffice.

Thus, passive ratification of private
anticompetitive conduct will not suffice to establishParker immunity. Parker"shelter[s] only
the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties which, in the judgment of the State, actually
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further state regulatory policies." 5 Further, and
of fundamental importance, those specific acts
must be subject to "ongoing regulation by the
State. 8 6 The government's duty to supervise
persists if the conferral of immunity is to be effective. Active supervision must be an ongoing
process, not a momentary event.
Parker immunity is "disfavored." 7 To satisfy the requirements of Parker,"[s]tates must
accept political responsibility for actions they
intend to undertake. 88 A state's decision to substitute a regime of regulation for the national
policy of competition as reflected in the federal
antitrust laws must be "implemented in its specific details"89 to assure that the "anticompetitive
scheme is the State's own."' The supervision
must not merely be lip service to the formalities
of regulation, thereby hiding inaction by the regulating agencies. 9' The requirement of active state
supervision is to prevent private parties from taking advantage of a state regulatory scheme for
their own private interests. 92
The validity of the hospital cooperation
laws is likely to rest on satisfying the "active su-

pervision" standard. Because the laws typically
express the desire to supersede the federal antitrust laws in pursuit of statutorily articulated state
policy objectives, the clear articulation test is
probably met.93
State hospital cooperation laws
Despite the positive effects on economic
behavior and consumer benefit that the antitrust
laws seek to promote, at least nineteen 94 states
have enacted laws to immunize behavior by hospitals or health care providers that otherwise
might be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. 95
These laws allow cooperative agreements among
hospitals or health care providers based on the
Parker v. Brown' state-action doctrine. These
.statutes vary significantly in the scope of coverage and the sophistication of approach. Some
follow a standardized legislative model while
others are unique. Some have broad coverage,
others are quite limited in scope.
Although the statutes all differ from one
another (even those based on the legislative
model), Tennessee's may be used as an example

Table 1. Hospital Cooperation Laws (as of Oct. 1995)
STATE AND CITATION

SCOPE/PARTIES

SPECIAL FEATURES

COLORADO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2432-2701 to 2715 (West 1994)*

hospitals must be one party

special board created to supervise the
agreements

FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.0406 (West 1995)

rural health networks

establishes rural health networks

FLA. STAT. ANN.

rural health networks

provides for antitrust immunity for rural
Eealth networks

GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-7-72 to 72.1 (1995)

county and municipal hospital
authorities

merger of such authorities within one
county allowed

IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4901 to 4904
(1995)*

health care providers

attorney general the only supervisory
authority

rural health networks

rural only

§ 395.606 (West 1995)

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-468 to 474 (1992)

1996
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KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-4955 to 4961 (1994)*

health care providers

permits mergers, does not affect rural health
networks, no attorney general involvement

1881 to 1888 (West 1994)*

hospitals and non-profit mental
health care providers

limited to hospitals and non-profit mental
health care providers, not applicable to
mergers

MINN. STAT. ANN.

providers and purchasers

mergers possible

health care facilities; physicians

facilities may form coop. agreements or
mergers with each other; physicians may
form coop. agmts with each other; state DOJ
supervisory agency

health care facilities and
providers
rural providers forming rural
networks

mergers not excepted from statute

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. fit. 22,

§§

§§ 62J.2911 to .2921 (West 1995)
MONT. CODE ANN.

§§

50-4-601 to 612 (1993)

NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-7701 to

7711 (1994)*
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
to 58
§§
(Mc2950
inneyt15)
(McKinney 1995)

______________

commissioner may make grants to assist the
establishment of rural health networks, no
involvement of attorney general

N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-192.1 to
.13 (1994)*

hospitals and other persons

hospital or hospital parent must be one
party, mergers allowed, no otherwise
prohibited self referrals

N. D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-17.5-01 to .5-12 (1995)*

health care providers and payers

health care provider must be one party,
statute not applicable to mergers

OHIO REV. STAT.
§§ 3727.21 to .24 (Baldwin 1995)
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 442.700 to .760
(1994)

hospitals

hospital only

Oregon Health Sciences Univ.
must be one party and an
entity(ies) with three hospitals in
one urban area the other(s)
hospitals

heart and kidney transplants only, perhaps
authorizing a monopoly within the state on
transplant services for OHSU

§§ 68-11-1301
to 1309 (1994)*
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 313.001 to .008 (West 1995)*
TENN. CODE ANN.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§

hospitals
rural public hospital districts

hospitals only, mergers not expressly
excepted from statute
hospitals only, statute not applicable to
mergers
rural public hospital districts only

70.44.450 to .460 (West 1995)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§

43.72.300 to .310 (West 1995)*

certified health plan, health care
facility, health care provider, or
other person involved in health
care

does not authorize specified per se
violations of the antitrust laws (price
fixing, boycotts, etc.), this law does not
limit the Washington law applicable to
rural public hospital districts

WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 150.84 to .86
(West 1994)*

health care providers

no state attorney involvement; applications
are approved unless denied within 30 days

WYO. STAT. §§ 35-24-101 to 106
(1995)

health care providers, purchasers,
and third party payors

a third party payor must be in
collaboration with a provider to be within
the statute, mergers not excepted from the
statute

States designated with a * have statutes based on a model, though there are significant differences across states.
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of the provisions and procedures frequently in- consultation and agreement with the attorney
cluded in the statutes. The Tennessee statute ap- general, the department may issue a certificate
plies to cooperative agreements between or of public advantage for a cooperative agreement
among two or more hospitals regarding the shar- if it determines that the applicants have demoning, allocation or referral of patients, personnel, strated by clear and convincing evidence that the
services and facilities; it does not cover other likely benefits resulting from the agreement outhealth care providers.97 There are three specific weigh any disadvantages attributable to a reduclimitations on the scope of cooperative activity tion in competition which may result.10
that can be approved under the terms of the TenIn evaluating the benefits, the department
nessee statute. The statute does not authorize hos- is required to consider whether one or more of
pitals pursuant to a cothe following benoperation agreement:
efits may accrue: A)
Hospitals
may
enter
into
1) to operate as health
enhanced quality of
maintenance organihospital care; B)
agreements
if
the
likely
zations ("HMOs")
preservation of
without being so lihospital services in
benefits stemming from the
censed; 2) to negotiate
geographic proxagreements outweigh any
terms with insurers,
imity to communiHMOs, or PPOs othtraditionally so
disadvantages attributable to ties
erwise prohibited unserved; C) gains in
der the antitrust laws;
cost efficiency of
a reduction in competition
or 3) to permit referservices provided
that may result.
rals to providerby the hospitals inowned facilities othervolved; D) imwise prohibited by law.98
provements in utilization of hospital resources;
Hospitals may enter into agreements if the and E) avoidance of duplication of hospital relikely benefits stemming from the agreements sources. Additionally, the department is required
outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a re- to evaluate at least the following potential disduction in competition that may result. 99 Parties advantages: 1) the adverse impact on the ability
to such an agreement may apply to the depart- of managed care organizations or other providment of health for a certificate of public advan- ers to negotiate optimal payment and service artage and must also submit the application to the rangements with hospitals and other providers;
attorney general. The attorney general and the 2) the extent of any reduction in competition
health department are entrusted with the active among health care providers other than hospiand continuing oversight of all cooperative agree- tals that is likely to result; 3) any adverse impact
ments.' ° The department of health reviews the on patients regarding quality, availability and
application and may hold a public hearing. The price of health services; and 4) the availability
department is required to give public notice and of arrangements that are less restrictive to comto allow interested parties to intervene. After petition to achieve the benefits sought.0 2
1996
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The department of health is required to
consult with the state attorney general regarding
any potential reduction in competition, and the
state attorney general may consult with the
United States Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.0 3 Provision is made for
terminating a certificate of public advantage by
the department of health or the state attorney general.I 4 Although the statute does not directly invoke the state-action immunity doctrine, it provides that a cooperative agreement approved
under procedures it sets forth is a lawful agreement notwithstanding' 05 any other provision of
law. ,0"
The Tennessee statute articulates a state
purpose and proposes to substitute state regulation for competition.0 7 The first part of the stateaction immunity test, requiring clear articulation
of a state policy to substitute regulation for competition, would, therefore, seem to be met. However, the "active supervision" requirement, which
mandates ongoing supervision by the state to
assure that governmental rather than not private
policies are being pursued, 08 raises substantial
questions. While the attorney general and the
health department are entrusted with the active
and continuing oversight of cooperative agreements, there are no procedures within the statute
that require continuing governmental supervision
after the approval process and the issuance of a
certificate of public advantage. Proposed Tennessee regulations require every holder of a certificate of public advantage to submit quarterly
reports and compliance certificates to the health
department. The health commissioner may require additional information and site visits. 109 Yet,
actual supervision must exist in fact, not just in
theory. 10 Mere passive ratification of private
decisions is not enough,"' and the unexercised
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power to supervise is also insufficient'" 2 to confer Parkerprotection.
In the only major action taken under hospital cooperation laws, 113 the Minnesota Commissioner of Health approved an agreement to
allow the merger of two hospital systems located
in the greater Minneapolis and Saint Paul areas." 4
The hospital systems did not fit within the DOJ/
FTC merger safety zone." 5 The Commissioner
found that the merger would result in cost savings to the users of the hospitals." 6 This was
shown through affidavits from major purchasers
of health care services in the area." 7 These affidavits indicated that through their contract negotiations with the hospitals savings had been
passed on to them." 8 Additionally, no purchasers filed negative comments regarding the
merger. " The affidavits also gave weight to the
argument that even post-merger, the market was
still competitive. 20 Arguably,'12 the existence of
the state statute allowed a merger that will
achieve cost efficiencies and that, through state
22
oversight, will pass on savings to payers.
Antitrust guidelines for health care
One purpose of the hospital cooperation
laws may have been to deal with perceived problems of uneven or inappropriate application of
the antitrust laws to hospitals or other health care
providers.' 23 However, in response to requests
and criticisms from providers, in 1993 and again
in 1994, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued joint guidelines
regarding their antitrust enforcement policies in
the health care field.

24

The 1994 guidelines currently include
nine statements on enforcement policy and analytical principles in the following areas:
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1) Mergers;
2) Hospital joint ventures involving equipment;
3) Hospital joint ventures involving specialized services;
4) Providers' collective provision of nonfee-related information;
5) Providers' collective provision of feerelated information;
6) Provider participation in exchanges of
price and cost information;
7) Joint purchasing arrangements among
providers;
8) Policy on physician network joint ventures; and
9) Analytical principles relating to
multiprovider networks.
Many of these guidelines apply to areas
that might be covered by state legislation concerning cooperative agreements among hospitals
or among health care providers, depending on
the scope of the particular statute. These guidelines and the accompanying analytical explanations may enable health care providers to proceed with various arrangements that will promote
efficiencies in the health care market with some
decreased risk of antitrust enforcement. Thoughtful application of antitrust laws may be an effective way to achieve the goals sought by the stateaction immunity laws with fewer, unanticipated
adverse consequences. 125 The promulgation of
these guidelines seems to have lessened the impetus for states to enact hospital cooperation
laws. The increased clarity of federal enforcement policy may enable health care providers to
achieve the benefits of joint endeavors with less
hassle' 26 and more certainty 127 than utilizing the
state-enacted hospital cooperation laws. Provid-
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ers will surely try first to fit within the guidelines and only resort to the hospital cooperation
laws as a second choice. That there has been only
one major use of hospital cooperation legislation (in Minnesota) suggests that these procedures are still less attractive to hospitals than the
28
traditional federal antitrust review process.
The impact of hospital cooperation laws
on consumers
(a) The hospital cooperation laws may
have a negligible impact on consumers as the
laws may be used only infrequently. There are
three reasons why this may be true: first, there
will be uncertainty that the state procedures will
be sufficient to confer antitrust immunity; second, receiving immunity may entail such significant state supervision as to be costly and burdensome; and third, the federal guidelines may
provide an alternate and more certain method to
achieve the same end.
1) In order to confer immunity
under the Parkerstate-action immunity doctrine,
a state must clearly articulate its intention to displace competition with regulation and must actively supervise the actions of the parties immunized from antitrust scrutiny. The hospital cooperation laws probably meet the clear articulation
test. The active supervision requirement poses
the nettlesome problem.
To satisfy the strictures of Parker,a state
must ensure that the policies being pursued by
private parties are those of the government. This
requires that the government supervision be
hands-on; actual 29 and ongoing 3 ° exercise of
supervisory authority is necessary for Parker
immunity to attach.
In Tennessee, by way of example, the stat-
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ute authorizes active and continuing oversight
of cooperative agreements by the department of
health and the attorney general, and the proposed
regulations require quarterly reports and allow
for additional oversight. If the health department
actually acts upon the reports and periodically
actively reviews the approved cooperative arrangements, that may be sufficient. But to achieve
Parkerimmunity, the state would have to affirmatively approve or disapprove' the "specific
details" 32 of the "particular anticompetitive acts
of private parties" '33 to assure that the
"anticompetitive scheme is the State's own."' 34
Few of the other states have statutory provisions for active supervision.' 35 Due to the lack
of statutory provisions, hospitals or health care
providers acting cooperatively with the approval
of the state health department may nevertheless
find themselves subject to antitrust laws because
the state supervision was not sufficiently active.
It will be difficult for parties to such agreements
to know their status with certainty. The parties
will have no control over their own supervision;
nor will they have the ability to require the state,
through the health department, to exercise active supervision. 36 As a result of this uncertainty,
providers have not (and may not) make much
use of the state hospital cooperation laws.
2) Even if the statute and regulations provide for adequate supervision to satisfy
the Parkerstandards, and even if the state agencies actually exercise their statutorily-conferred
supervisory powers, hospitals and other providers may not utilize the state statutes because of
the loss of decisionmaking autonomy and the burdensome costs. The intrusiveness and the transaction costs of complying with the required supervision may be greater than the advantage to
be gained from the cooperation agreement. That
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is, merging a service currently offered by two
hospitals might be economically efficient for both
hospitals. However, the costs of demonstrating
the advantages of the collective conduct, of producing on a continuing basis the reports required
to show the savings and the use of the savings,'37
and of complying with site visits or any other
such requirements might be greater than the savings generated. It may be a Catch 22 situation: if
the supervision is sufficient to confer immunity,
its costs might exceed the benefits to be gained.
3) The federal guidelines remove
from DOJ/FTC antitrust enforcement scrutiny
many arrangements that the hospital cooperation
laws may have been intended to cover. If an
agreement fits within the federal guidelines, the
federal enforcement agencies have announced
that they will not pursue enforcement efforts. In
such circumstances, there is a much-reduced
antitrust risk. Even though antitrust courts are
not bound by the DOJ/FTC guidelines, and private parties can bring antitrust actions, the antitrust risk is likely to be sufficiently small so that
a private party will see no compelling reason, as
a practical matter, to apply for a state's blessing
by complying with the necessarily cumbersome
and expensive state procedures. As a result, applications for approval of cooperative agreements
likely will involve situations that fall outside the
federal guidelines and, thus, entail more risk of
anticompetitive pricing and increased costs to
consumers.
Furthermore, the DOJ/FTC guidelines
provide an alternative procedure to the state process. Under the guidelines, the federal antitrust
enforcement agencies have promised to respond
to business review or advisory opinion requests
within 90 days after all necessary information is
received. 38 Thus, instead of going through the
Volume 8, number 3

ments among health care providers to reduce the
number of providers so that insufficient numbers
remain for competition among them to be effective. States must be cognizant of this problem
and not foreclose the possibility of using competition to reduce costs by approving cooperative agreements that eliminate the possibility of
competition. 4 ' Although some commentators
assert that the health care industry is different
and price competition is not suitable, 42 recent
studies' 43 and other reported information' 44 regarding the effectiveness of competition to reduce costs yet mainU
quality 145
tain
would seem to
Cost shifting e nabled
counter this argubsidize
indigent
hOS l stoSU
ment.'46
Hospitals
care, specializ ?d services,
traditionally have
medical educa tion, research or used their insulation from price
hy
ndeavors.
competition to cost
other wort

state procedure, the parties may prefer to utilize
the federal procedure. It is not clear which procedure will be more time-consuming and costly.
The federal review process has the advantage of
less uncertainty - assuring parties of the enforcement decision of the federal antitrust agencies. Private antitrust actions, however, remain
available. While the state procedures confer immunity if effective, there is always the risk that
the supervision by the appropriate state agency
will be inadequate to confer immunity successfully under the Parkerstate-action doctrine.
(b) Coopera-

tive agreements may
lead to efficiencies,
but they also have the
potential to be cozy
arrangements for the
benefit of the participants to the detriment

of payers for health
care. In most fields,
competition is generally regarded as the best method of supplying
consumers with goods and services of a given
quality at the lowest price. Meaningful price competition among health care providers, stimulated
by the interest of employers, unions, insurance
companies, and other payers in containing health
care costs, is emerging in some areas of the country. 13 9 Managed care entities that supervise the

quality and quantity of care given their enrollees
and that, by their aggregation of patients into
large groups can bargain effectively with health
care providers for reduced rates, are becoming
more widespread." ° The possibility of effectively using market competition to restrain health
care costs will be diminished or even eliminated
in some areas if states allow cooperative agree-
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shift - that is, to
charge different payers different prices. Cost
shifting enabled hospitals to subsidize indigent
care, specialized services, medical education,
research or other worthy endeavors. Effective
competition reduces the ability of hospitals to
cost shift. 47 Hospital cooperation laws may enable hospitals and other health care providers to
maintain or reestablish the conditions necessary
for cost shifting.'4 If this is the case, application
of the hospital cooperation laws may mean increased costs for many payers and increased surpluses for the hospitals. These surpluses would
then provide hospitals with funds to apply elsewhere. There is a real problem of accountability
in this type of effort. The magnitude of the subsidy is blurred, and careful attention to trade-offs

FeatureArticle * 259

is difficult in this context. 149
The impact of the hospital cooperation
laws on the consumer will also depend on how
the health departments and attorneys general
evaluate the statutory benefits and disadvantages
of the cooperation agreements. Evaluation of the
statutory benefits and disadvantages will be difficult and almost any result can probably be justified. For one thing, the benefits and disadvantages are not ranked in order of importance. Additionally, the statutory benefits themselves are
inherently contradictory.'5 ° Some benefits are
directed at increased efficiency and cost control
while others are directed at quality and geographic access. Enhancement of the quality of
care in hospitals and preservation of geographic
access to hospitals are likely to increase costs.
However, gains in cost efficiency are likely to
reduce costs or slow the rate of cost increase. It
is unclear whether the two other benefits increase
or decrease costs. Improvements in utilization
of hospital resources may be achieved by consolidating under-used services that might
lower costs. Subsidizing increased utilization of
hospital resources, on the other hand, is likely to
increase costs. Avoiding duplication of hospital
resources may serve to increase efficiency and
reduce prices, or it may serve to increase market
power and increase prices. Since the benefits are
not prioritized, the process is highly politicized,
with the health department and the attorney general possibly disagreeing on the evaluation of the
overall public benefit to be achieved by the cooperative agreement. The resolution of competing statutory goals will take place in a forum
where the process could be tilted to favor the
highly organized and concentrated interests.
The typical statute does set a standard that
the benefits must outweigh the disadvantages by
260 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

clear and convincing evidence. This gives guidance to those applying the statute that the benefits, whichever ones are decided to be most
important, must be significantly greater than the
disadvantages. Yet this is a very difficult standard to apply, and judicial review is likely to be
extremely deferential. On balance, it is appropriate to view these provider-cooperation statutes with some skepticism, particularly as evidence accrues that competition in the health care
industry results in desirable outcomes when properly structured. There is a real risk of market distortion from hidden taxation and the supersession of federal antitrust laws.'5 '
Conclusion
There are insufficient data to reach a firm
conclusion regarding the benefits to or effects
on consumers of hospital or provider cooperation legislation based on the actual application
of these laws. The one major decision,
Minnesota's decision to allow the merger of two
hospital systems in Minneapolis/St. Paul, was
reached after consideration of the efficiencies to
be realized and of mechanisms to pass the cost
savings on to the purchasers of health care. Since
this merger occurred in a major metropolitan
area, it is likely that significant competition remained. The Minnesota decision was a thoughtful evaluation of costs and efficiencies and the
effect of the merger on the market. But even in
that case, a thoughtful and knowledgeable analyst has expressed skepticism about the benefits
52
for consumers.
Competition is working to reduce costs
in markets where structures conducive to effective competition exist. This result will likely expand as managed care grows-as shown in stud-
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ies of recent data and in anecdotal newspaper
coverage. In a short period of time, Massachusetts has surpassed California as the state with
the highest percentage of people enrolled in managed care entities.'53 Most people live in population centers which either have competitive
health care markets or potentially competitive
markets. It is clearly not desirable for state immunity laws to eliminate competition or the possibility of competition in markets where the
population is large enough to support competing
hospitals or competing managed care plans. Even
if price competition is not yet active in an area,
foreclosing the possibility eliminates the efficien-
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Compare Frederic J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration:The
Needfor anAppropriateAntitrustPolicy, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 107 (1994) with David L. Meyer & Charles F (Rick)
Rule, Health CareCollaborationDoes Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994).
There is a serious question whether the goals of a regulatory
regime are (or can be), politically confined to the achievement of economic efficiency. Cross-subsidization of preferred
services rather than economic efficiency may be the driving
force for regulation. That requires the generation and recapturing of supra-competitive returns, which, in turn, are dependent on and necessitate a less-than-competitive economic
environment. See James F. Blumstein, Health CareReform
and Competing Visions of Medical Care:Antitrust and State
ProviderCooperationLegislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459,
1498-1501 (1994) [hereinafter Blumstein, Competing Visions].
2 See infra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
For an early discussion of the case for greater emphasis on
market-oriented policies in the health care industry, see James
F Blumstein & FrankA. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role
in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor
Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981).
4 See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1, at 1482.
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cies that may be realized in the future. State
policy makers should be extremely cautious regarding cooperative agreements among health
care providers just as competitive forces are
emerging that will rationalize the efficiency of
the health care marketplace to the benefit of consumers. This is a time for prudence before reestablishing the regulatory paradigm, based on
possibly outdated data, just as newer evidence
strongly suggests the viability of and benefits
from properly structured competition and appropriate incentives in the health care arena.
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I at 1482-86.
Id.
See James M. Klingensmith, Applying Antitrust Concepts to
the Acute Care Hospital Industry: Defining the Relevant
Marketfor HospitalServices, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.

153, 154 (1988).
Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. II
1990). See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982).
Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. II
1990). See Morgenstern, M.D. v. Wilson, M.D., 29 F3d 1291
(8th Cir. 1994).
9 Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). See Barr Lab., Inc. v.
Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1992); Advanced HealthCare Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 9 10 F.2d 139
(4th Cir. 1990).
10Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). See U.S. v. Carilion
Health Sys., 707 E Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989); U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp. 717 R Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd,
89 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West
1995). See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 94 FT.C. 701 (1979), affd as modified, 638 F2d
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443 (2d Cir. 1980), and aff d by an equally divided court,
452 U.S. 678 (1982); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). The
Robinson-Patman provision establishes fairness among competitors rather than economic efficiency as its primary objective. This provision has been much criticized by commentators. See Klingensmith, supra note 6, at 154-55. To the extent
that state provider-cooperation laws immunize conduct that
is pro-competitive but that could violate Robinson-Patman,
economic efficiency might well be enhanced.
See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1,at 179.
The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have formulated
guidelines regarding their exercise of prosecutorial discretion in administering the antitrust laws. If conduct falls within
the safety zones spelled out in those guidelines, then no enforcement action will be pursued by the agencies. See U.S.
Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of
Enforcement Policy and Analytical PrinciplesRelating to
Health Careand Antitrust (Sept. 27, 1994), reprinted in 4
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,152 at 20,769.
These provider cooperation laws have been enacted under the
state-action antitrust immunity doctrine. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a discussion of the development of
this doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 70-74. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, state laws that conflict with or that

are inconsistent with federal laws are unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). Under
Parker,however, federal antitrust laws do not apply to certain state and state-approved anticompetitive private conduct.
Thus, Parkerreverses the general principle that federal laws
prevail over state laws. See Blumstein, Competing Visions,
supra note 1,at 1486-87. See also James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1255, 1297-98 (1994).
16

17

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(d) (1994). Florida,
Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have
similar formulations based on balancing possible benefits
against anticompetitive effects. See infra Table I (Hospital
Cooperation Laws). In contrast to this balancing of overall
benefits against anticompetitive effects, antitrust laws eliminate non-efficiency-based criteria from analytical consideration. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health
Care ConsiderationsinAntitrustAnalysis,51 LAW & CoNTEw.
PROBS. 273, 292-93 (Spring 1988) (asserting consumer welfare model of antitrust enforcement focuses "solely on
allocative and productive efficiency" and that "prevailing
antitrust standards are largely in accord with this 'consumer
welfare model'".)
See, e.g., Harold S. Luft et al., The Role of Specialized Clinical Services in CompetitionAmong Hospitals,23 INQUIRY 83,
93 (1986) [hereinafter Luft et al., Specialized Clinical Services] (asserting that competition among hospitals focused
on attracting physicians through the offer of specialized services and that this type of competition led to a proliferation
of clinical services and cost inflation); James C. Robinson &
Harold Luft, The Impact of Hospital Market Structure on
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Patient Volume,Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care,
4 J. HEALTH ECON. 333, 353-54 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson
& Luft, HospitalMarket Structure] (supporting the hypothesis that in a cost-based mode of reimbursement greater competition is associated with higher rather than lower costs.);
James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the
Cost of HospitalCare, 1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241, 3244
(1987) [hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost]
(presenting data indicating that hospital costs were substantially higher in more competitive markets consistent with the
"medical arms race" hypothesis that competition among hospitals took the form of cost-increasing acquisition of new technology attractive to physicians and patients); J. Michael
Woolley & H.E. Frech, III, How Hospitals Compete: A Review of the Literature,2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 65-75
(1988-89) [hereinafter Woolley & Frech,How HospitalsCompete] (citing many studies which generally showed, under
various methodologies, competitive hospital markets had
higher prices); Jack Zwanziger and Glenn A. Melnick, The
Effects of Hospital Competition and the Medicare PPS Program on Hospital Cost Behavior in California, 7 J. HEALTH
ECON. 301,301-05 (1988) [hereinafter Zwanziger & Melnick,
Competition and the Medicare PPS Program] (discussing
studies using data from the 1970s and the early 1980s showing higher costs in competitive markets).
8 Milt Freudenheim, Doctors Are Sparring with Insurers over
Right to Join Health Networks, N.Y. TIMES, JULY 12, 1994, at
A8.
'9 See Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra note
17, at 58, 61; Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra
note 17, at 3244; and Luft et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at 83.
20See Larry M. Manheim & Joe Feinglass, Hospital CostIncentives in a FragmentedHealth Care System, 19(l) HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REV. 56, 56 (1994); David Dranove et al., Price and
Concentration in HospitalMarkets: The Switch from PatientDriven to Payer-Driven Competition, 36 J.L. & EcON. 179,
179-81 (1993) [hereinafter Dranove et al., Payer-DrivenCompetition];Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra
note 17, at 60-6 1.
21

See

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN

5 (1982); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of
PhysicianBehavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431,445-47 (1988).
See Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra note
17, at 59.
23 See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note I, at 1463-64.
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Starr, supra note 21, at 226-27. Starr has argued that the dominance of professionals has perpetuated the imbalance in information available to patients, and, thereby, has perpetuated
professional power vis a vis patients. That is, professionalism may in part be a cause, not just a response, to market
failure (the asymmetry of information between physician and
patient).
See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,947-49 (1963) (arguing that the professional paradigm is a response to market
failure in the medical care marketplace - the unpredictable
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nature of the need for medical care and the ignorance of the
consumer); Starr, supra note 21, at 226-27 (noting that uncertainty and consumer ignorance may be promoted by the
professional paradigm, thereby perpetuating the empowerment of professionals in medical care decisionmaking).
26 See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17,
at 83; Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra note
17, at 60-61.
27 See id., at 83.
21

See Dranove, et al., Payer-DrivenCompetition,supranote 20,
at 180; Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Market Structure
and Bargaining Position on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH
EcON. 217, 231 (1992) [hereinafter Melnick, Market Structure and Bargaining Position]; James C. Robinson, HMO
Market Penetrationand Hospital Cost Inflation in California, 266 JAMA 2719, 2723 (1991) [hereinafter Robinson,
HMO MarketPenetration];Zwanziger & Melnick, Competition and the Medicare PPSProgram, supra note 17, at 316;
and Jack Zwanziger et al., Cost and Price Competition in
California Hospitals, 1980-1990, 13 HEALTH AFF. 118, 124

(Fall 1994) [hereinafter Zwanziger et al., California Hospitals, 1980-1990].
29 See Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17, at
3241.
0 See id. at 3244; Zwanziger & Melnick, Competition and the
Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17, at 305. For a more
generalized discussion of the relationship between the nature
of competition and the containment of costs, see Thomas L.
Greaney, ManagedCompetition,IntegratedDelivery Systems
and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1513-14 (1994).

See Luft et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supranote 17, at
92.
32 See Luft et al., SpecializedClinical Services, supranote 17, at
93; Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17,
at 3241.
See Luft et al., SpecializedClinical Services, supra note 17, at
91.
3 See generally Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit
the HospitalIndustry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980); Philip
C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing
the ConventionalWisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1982).
31See Luft et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17, at
83. See also Hall, supra note 21, at 506.
36 See Luft et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17, at
93.
37Robinson & Luft, HospitalMarket Structure,supra note 17,
at 342. See also United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F.
Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1989).
38 Critics of the use of markets in medical care often have relied
on those studies to suggest that the market for medical care
was different and that competition could not achieve its traditional objective of economic efficiency. See, e.g., Entin et
al., supra note 1. As the later studies have shown, see infra
notes 50-54, and as current anecdotal experience is demonstrating, the market in medical care responds to incentives as
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in other markets. Where, as in regulated industries, the terms
of competition are constrained, the consequences of competition may be socially ill-adaptive. The policy issue then becomes what policy pathway to pursue - give up on the market and impose a regulatory solution that substitutes for the
market, or improve the functioning of the market to create an
appropriate set of incentives.
3 See Robinson & Luft, HospitalMarket Structure,supra note
17, at 354. An alternative explanation of the evidence focuses
on market conditions from the position of the dominant physicians. In seemingly competitive markets, conditions were
advantageous to physicians upon whose referrals hospitals
relied to fill patient beds. In effect, the physicians prices went
down (or value of services went up). In more concentrated
markets, the margins available to physicians were recaptured
by the hospitals, having more market leverage. From the perspective of physicians, prices went up in those markets, as
there was less surplus made available to referring physicians,
upon whom such hospitals were presumably less dependent.
0 See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
4' Health care costs rose sufficiently - both in terms of rate of
increase and absolute levels of expenditure - to attract serious employer attention. Employers became willing to confront the difficult employee-relationship issues involved in
changing or limiting an unconstrained fee-for-service system.
Insurance companies modified their range of options to accommodate employer concerns and to compete with HMOs.
Historically, physicians have resisted perceived inroads on their professional autonomy by engaging in collective action. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United
States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (holding a refusal by fee-forservice physicians to deal with HMO physicians to be a violation of the ShermanAct).At one time, there was some question about the scope of antitrust applicability to professional
activity. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (stating that "forms of competition
usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession"). Faced with this type of potential collective resistance and the uncertain status of antitrust enforcement against such collective physician conduct,
payers were understandably reluctant to take aggressive costcontainment measures.
That the antitrust laws apply to professional activity is
now settled. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975). Collective action relating to fees, even
for purported reasons of improving professional quality, violates the antitrust laws. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that collective refusal of court-appointed trial lawyers in criminal defense cases
to accept appointment because of low fee levels constituted a
per se violation of the antitrust law). See also Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding maximum fee agreements among physicians, arranged
by the Maricopa County Medical Society, to be per se unlawful price fixing agreements); In re Michigan State Medical
Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (invalidating physicians' collective conduct in negotiating with Blue Cross/Blue Shield
regarding the insurer's cost-containment efforts). In a recent
example, the Justice Department concluded that hospitals in
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Danbury, Connecticut and St. Joseph, Missouri joined with
physicians in illegal price fixing schemes to keep out lowercost managed care companies. Both hospitals operated in monopoly situations. The cases were settled by consent decrees.
See Thomas J. Lueck, Illegal Price-Fixing Charged in
Danbury Hospital Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at B6.
For further cases and discussion, see Greaney, supra note
30, at 1524, and Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 183-86.
These antitrust decisions have limited the ability of physicians and physician organizations to resist competition and
inhibit the formation of innovative methods of providing care
and containing cost.
42 See Glenn A. Melnick & Jack Zwanziger, Hospital Behavior
under Competition and Cost-Containment Policies: The California Experience, 1980 to 1985, 260 JAMA 2669, 2669
(1988) [hereinafter Melnick & Zwanziger, The California
Experience, 1980-85]; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration,
supra note 28, at 2719.
43 See David Dranove & William D. White, Recent Theory
and
Evidence on Competition in Hospital Markets, 3 J. EcON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 169, 193-94 (1994); Melnick & Zwanziger,
The California Experience, 1980 to 1985, supra note 42, at
2669; James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition,
Regulation, and Hospital Costs, 1982 to 1986, 260 JAMA
2676, 2676 (1988) [hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competition, Regulation, and Hospital Costs]; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration, supra note 28, at 2719; Zwanziger & Melnick,
Competition and the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17,
at 316-17; Jack Zwanziger et al., Hospitals and Antitrust:
Defining Markets, Setting Standards, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
AND L. 423, 424 (1994) [hereinafter Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards]; Zwanziger et al., California
Hospitals, 1980-1990, supra note 28, at 123.
Social Security Amendments of 1983, § 42 U.S.C.A. 1395ww
(West 1992 and Supp. 1995).
"

4A

Prior to the adoption of PPS, Medicare had reimbursed providers on the basis of their costs. Under cost-based reimbursement, there are no incentives to contain costs; increased costs
result in increased reimbursement. DRGs are specified conditions for which Medicare will pay a fixed amount based on
the average costs to treat the condition. If a hospital is able to
treat the condition for less than the average amount, the hospital may reain the amount. However, the hospital is at risk
for treatment costs above the DRG payment. For a description of the DRG system, see Kathryn G. Sophy, Comment,
Diagnosis Related Groups and the Price of Cost Containment, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 305, 306-07 (1986);
Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 499, 505-07 (1990).
Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") provides comprehensive health services to a defined population, its enrollees, in return for a fixed payment per enrollee. There are several different organizational models for HMOs. The physicians who provide care to the enrollees may be employed by
one HMO and only have those HMO enrollees as their patients; alternatively, the physicians may have contractual re-

lationships with one or more HMOs and may see only HMO
enrollees or may also see other patients. Some HMOs are
mixed models. Since payment to the HMO is fixed regard-
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less of the medical care needed, the HMO has incentives to
use cost effective care. Thus, HMOs try to reduce hospital
based care and specialist care through oversight and economic
incentives to providers and try to contract with providers who
offer cost effective care. Depending on the type of HMO,
enrollees may have to pay entirely or partially for care provided by providers other than HMOs; thus, enrollees have
great incentives to use the HMO providers. This, in turn,
gives HMOs bargaining power with respect to providers regarding price and quality. See Stephen S. Boochever, Health
Maintenance Organizations in ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS: HMO's, PPO's AND CMP's (Jeanie M. Johnson, ed.

1986); John F Shields et al., The Cost of Legislative Restrictions on Contracting Practices: The Cost to Government,
Employers and Families, Lewin-VHI, Inc., Report to
Healthcare Leadership Council, Alliance for Managed Care,
and Health Insurance Association ofAmerica, ii-iii (June 2 1,
1995); Lawrence P. Casalino, Balancing Incentives: How
Should Physicians Be Reimbursed?, 267 JAMA 403, 404
(1992); and Daniel K. Zismer, Physician Incentives in a
Managed Care World, 37 HEALTHCARE F.J. 39 (Sept./Oct.
1994).
A Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO") is a discounted
fee-for-service system with varying degrees of treatment oversight with regard to hospital and specialist use. Providers in
the PPO agree to discount the services they provide to a designated population. If those persons insured under a PPO do
not use the designated PPO providers, they are required to
pay higher co-payments. Providers in a PPO have incentives

to provide efficient care because of the discount; however,
they also have incentives to increase the volume of care provided. The higher co-payment which PPO insureds are required to pay to non-PPO providers gives the insureds incentives to use PPO providers. This control of patient behavior
gives PPOs the ability to bargain with their providers regarding price and quality. See Michael F. Anthony, Preferred Provider Organizations in ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS:
HMO's, PPO's AND CMP's (Jeanie M. Johnson, ed. 1986);
Shields, supra note 46, at ii-iii; Casalino, supra note 46, at
403; Zismer, supra note 46, at 39.
See Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience 19801985, supra note 42, at 2670. The Federal Health Maintenance Act of 1973 preempts state laws that inhibit or prevent
the formation of HMOs. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1988).
Some state HMO legislation expands the federal legislation
and enables HMOs to employ physicians rather than to contract with a professional corporation of physicians to provide
services. Additionally, state HMO legislation allowed business corporations to form HMOs. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 56-32-201 - 225 (1994). Although HMOs existed prior to
the adoption of the 1973 federal legislation, the federal law
as amended enabled and stimulated the formation of HMOs,
which were organized to compete on the basis of price as
well as quality.
9 See Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience, 19801985, supra note 42, at 2675; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration, supra note 28, at 2723; Dranove et al.,Payer-Driven
Competition, supra note 20, at 180-81. The rate of increase
in inpatient costs adjusted for inflation increased at an average rate of almost 5% in 1980-82 and decreased by almost
2% in the 1983-85 period. Melnick & Zwanziger, The Cali-
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fornia Experience, 1980 to 1985, supra note 42, at 2672.
Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience, 1980 1985, supra note 42, at 2669.
d. at 2670.

52 Id.
-3

at 2672.

Id. at 2673.
See Robinson, HMO Market Penetration,supra note 28, at
2723. However, the cost reductions achieved (9.4% lower rate
of inflation) are to be contrasted with the rate of cost increase
per admission during the period (74.5%).

s See Dranove et al., Payer-DrivenCompetition,supra note 20,
at 179, 182; Melnick, Market Structure and BargainingPosition, supra note 28, at 231-32; Ron Winslow, Is Victory in
Sight in Health-CareWar?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb.
28, 1995, at I (attributing a 1.1% drop in average costs per
employee from a Foster Higgins survey of employers' shifts
to enrollment in managed care plans); Zwanziger & Melnick,
Competition and the Medicare PPS Program,supra note 17,
at 316; Zwanziger et al., California Hospitals, 1980-1990,
supra note 28, at 123; Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets,
Setting Standards,supra note 43, at 429; and Shields, supra
note 46, at iv. For recent data on health care cost reductions
in California, seeAlain C. Enthoven and Sara J. Singer, Managed Competition in the California Health Care Economy,
14 HEALTH AFF. (Winter 1995).
56

Under traditional health insurance plans, patients do not have
the same motivation to be cost conscious. In the absence of
substantial deductibles and copayments, patients face little
incentive to be cost conscious. Even with copayments, the
phenomenon of moral hazard exists, since patients'
copayments typically amount to 20% of expenses. The divergence between individual cost and actual social cost in such
circumstances is graphically depicted in Clark C. Havighurst
& James F Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs
in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6,
17-18 (1975).
Under traditional fee-for-service payment practices,
physicians' economic incentives are aligned with their professional perception that more is better in medical care. Economic incentives for cost constraints are, therefore, similarly
lacking.
See Dranove et al., Payer-DrivenCompetition,supra note 20,
at 183; Zwanziger et al., California Hospitals, 1980-1990,
supra note 28, at 120; Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets,
Setting Standards,supra note 43, at 427-29. A study of data
from California from 1983 to 1988 concluded that under the
influence of a payer-driven market, margins, measured using
the bargained-for price rather than the list price, were falling
in competitive markets. See Dranove et al., Payer-Driven
Competition, supra note 20, at 201. California hospitals having more than ten other hospitals within a fifteen mile radius
had an adjusted inflation rate of 40.5%; California hospitals
having fewer than ten hospitals within a fifteen mile radius
had an adjusted inflation rate of 62.0%; the adjusted rate in
the 43 other (participating) states was 58.4%. See Robinson
& Luft, Competition,Regulation, and Hospital Costs, supra
note 43, at 2679. Another study examined hospital selective
contracting by the Blue Cross PPO in California and showed
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that the PPO was able to secure lower prices for its patients
in competitive markets. See Melnick, Market Structure and
BargainingPosition, supra note 28, at 229, 231.
11See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1, at 1463-74.
59See Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17,
at 3241.
1 See Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards,
supra note 43, at 442-44; and Zwanziger et al., California
Hospitals,1980-1990, supra note 28, at 125.
61 See Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards,
supra note 43, at 423.
62 See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 182-220.
1 See U.S. Dept. Of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Careand Antitrust, supra note 14; Commissioner Christine Varney, New Directions at the FTC: Efficiency Justifications in Hospital Mergers and Vertical Integration Concerns, (Remarks Before the Health CareAntitrust
Forum) (May 2, 1995) (stating that, as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, the FTC should emphasize efficiency justifications
in examining hospital mergers and that such a focus would
likely result in fewer challenges to mergers). For discussion,
see 4 HEALTH L. REP. 681 (1995).
64

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).

See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
6 Parker,317 U.S. at 351 ("In a dual system of government in
which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.").
67 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 25 (1983). But see Einer
Richard Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 667, 717-29 (1991) (critiquing view of the state-action doctrine).

61

I FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992).
9 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
70 Parker, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
71The raisin proration scheme was a clear effort by California
"to substitute sales quotas and price control - the purest form
of economic regulation - for competition in the market for
California raisins." See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Parker,317 U.S. at 352.
73 Id. at
74

350-51.
Columbia, 499 U.S. at 370.

1 California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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78
79
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01

one point, it was not clear whether state-action immunity
could be conferred by a state on a private party. See Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585-92 (1976) (plurality).
Justice Stevens, for a plurality of four justices (Stevens,
Brennan, Marshall, and White), concluded that Parker immunity could only be extended to state officials in their official capacities. Id. at 591. The Solicitor General advocated
that position, id. at 588-89, but it has not prevailed. See Patrick
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1988) (stating that the Parker
doctrine can immunize private parties in appropriate situations). Thus, Parker immunity applies to private, as well as
governmental defendants, see Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.

of May 1994. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Health
Care: Federal and State Antitrust Actions Concerning the
Health CareIndustry,at 12 (August 1994). Wyoming enacted
provider cooperation legislation in 1995.

76 At

Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
State officials must "have and [actually] exercise" the power
"to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties
and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy."
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). Passive ratification of private anticompetitive conduct by government is insufficient.
"The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate
substitute for a decision by the State. In the absence of active
supervision in fact, there can be no state-action immunity for
what were otherwise private price fixing arrangements." FTC
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2179 (1992).
The "active supervision" requirement serves "essentially the
evidentiary function of ensuring that the actor is engaging in
the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy." Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
Id. at 47. Where the actor is a municipality, "there is little or
no [such] danger" and, therefore, no "active supervision" requirement. Id. Thus, local government health care providers
such as municipal hospitals may only need to show a clearly
articulated policy to replace competition with regulation (and
not active supervision) for them to be within the state-action
immunity doctrine.

9 See infra Table I, Hospital Operation Laws.
9 Parker,317 U.S. 341 (1943).
9 TENN. CODE ANN.

IId. at §§ 68-11-1308-09.
91Id. at § 68-11-1303(a).
100Id. at § 68-11-1303(b).
101Id. at §§ 68-I 1-1303(c) and (d).
102Id. at
103 Id.

Id.

17

Id. at 2178.

00

Id.

09

Id. at 2176.

9 Id. at 2177.
9, Id. at 2179-80.
92 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100.
91 See Sarah S. Vance, Immunityfor ProviderCollaboration,62
ANTiTRusr L.J. 409, 421-23 (1994).
94 The General Accounting Office identified eighteen states that
had enacted some form of provider cooperation legislation as
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§§ 68-11-1303(d)(1) and (2).

at § 68-11-1303(e).

1o4Id. at § 68-11-1303(f) (with respect to the health department); id. at § 68-11-1305 (with respect to the state attorney general).
'o. See supra text accompanying notes 66 & 67. See also licor,
112 S. Ct. at 2176 ("[Flederal antitrust laws are subject to
supersession by state regulatory programs").
'o TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1306(a).
'07

See id. at §§ 68-11-1303-06.

licor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177 (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S.
94, 100-101 (1988)).
Proposed Tenn. Dept. of Health, Rules and Regulations Governing the Hospital Cooperation Act of 1993, 1200-24-5-.05.
1o 7icor, 112 S.Ct. at 2179.

'o

Id. at 2179-80.
112Id.
"3

4 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
". 7icor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177.

6

§ 68-11-1302(2) (1994).

"4

"5

Three other states have used their provider cooperation process: Maine has approved an agreement among three hospitals for the joint operation of a magnetic resonance imaging
machine; Oregon has approved a joint kidney transplant program between two hospitals; and Washington has allowed
eight rural hospitals to send nonemergency laboratory work
to a central laboratory. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Health Care: Federal and State Antitrust Actions Concerning the Health Care Industry, at II (August 1994).
Findings of Fact, Conclusions, Order and Memorandum issued by Minnesota Commissioner of Health, IN RE APPLICATION OF HEALTHSPAN HEALTH SYSTEMS CORPORATION (July 22, 1994) [hereinafter Minn. Memo].
See infra text accompanying notes 121 & 122. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the merger safety zone provides
that the FTC, and the DOJ will not challenge a merger of two
hospitals if (I) one of the hospitals is more than four years
old and (2) during the last three years, one of the hospitals
averaged fewer than 100 licensed beds and fewer than 40
patients. If a merger is outside the safety zone, the agencies
will consider whether competitors remain post merger,
whether cost savings will be realized, and whether a failing
hospital is involved.
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16
1i?

Minn. Memo, supra note 114, at 9.
Id.

'27

'18 Id.
9

Id. at 23.

Id. at 10.
It is unclear whether the antitrust laws would have barred a
pro-competitive merger in any event. However, without a state
process that provides assurance, and in the absence of compliance with DOJ/FTC antitrust enforcement safety zone, the
merger might not have taken place as a practical matter because of the risk stemming from legal uncertainty.
122 Some analysts of the Minnesota hospital merger were skeptical of the consumer benefits. See Roger Feldman, Huge Health
Care Mergers Bode Ill, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, August 8,
1992, atA2. For an analysis of the Greater Minneapolis HMO
market and the conclusion that competition leads to lower
HMO premiums, see Douglas Wholey, Roger Feldman & Jon
B. Christiansen, The Effect ofMarket Structure on HMO Premiums, 14 J. HEALTH ECON. 81 (1995); Roger Feldman, The
Welfare Economics of a Health PlanMerger, 6 J.REG. ECON.
67 (1994).

120

121

One speculative hypothesis regarding the Minneapolis hospital merger is that the large purchasers with clout in
the market remained content to accept an arrangement that
resulted in lower prices for them, while leaving open the possibility of the merged hospitals using their increased leverage to extract higher prices from less well organized purchasers of services. Widely dispersed consumer interests would
not necessarily find their interest served by the costly participation in an administrative/regulatory proceeding. That type
of participation, with its attendant costs in legal and economic
expert fees, possesses a public good aspect. Theory would
suggest that such an expense will be unlikely to be borne by
a single small market participant.
See Entin et al., supra note 1, at 118-20. See also Nguyen
Xuan Nguyen & Frederick W. Derrick, Hospital Markets and
Competition: Implications for Antitrust Policy, 19 HEALTH
CARE MGMT. REV. 35 (1994).
124 The agencies also may have wanted to avoid having a major
industry slip out from under antitrust scrutiny if all states
passed hospital cooperation laws and liberally applied such
laws consistent with the requirements of the state-action immunity doctrine.
'3

12

'2

See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 171. ("[T]he sweeping
calls for antitrust immunities amount to the proverbial 'throwing the baby out with the bath water'... . [T]he federal antitrust laws.., provide a great degree of flexibility for private
collaborative efforts aimed at achieving more efficient and
less costly delivery of health care services.").
The hassle involved in complying with state provider cooperation laws derives from the detailed presentation which must
be made as part of the state's review process. In the absence
of a serious and substantive review process, the state provider cooperation laws will not succeed in conferring antitrust immunity upon the private parties involved in the joint
conduct.
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The uncertainty regarding immunity conferred by hospital
cooperation legislation arises from the need-in order to establish Parker-immunity-for active and ongoing state supervision. The state's issuance of a certificate of public advantage will only be effective as a shield from antitrust enforcement if the state, in fact, fulfills its supervision responsibility.
In the first case settled since the guidelines were published,
the Department of Justice, the Florida Attorney General's
office, and two voluntary hospital systems in the St. Petersburg area agreed to a partnership arrangement, but not a
merger. This partnership agreement allowed the hospitals to
provide services jointly in areas with numerous competitors
in some outpatient services, open heart surgery, laboratory
and diagnostic services, some specialized high technology
services, and others. Additionally, the hospitals were allowed
to consolidate administrative services such as accounting,
communications, medical staff organization, and medical
record keeping. By allowing joint ventures in specialized tertiary care services which compete in a larger geographic market, the agreement has the potential to reduce costs by increasing utilization and may improve outcomes by permitting the same personnel to work together more frequently.
The agreement did not allow the two systems to discuss managed care contracting, pricing, or marketing. See Landmark
Federal-State Settlement Clears Way for Innovative Partnership, 3 HEALTH L. REP. 830, 830-31 (1994).

'

Similarly, the Department of Justice in a business review letter declined to challenge a proposed plan under antitrust law.
Businesses and health care providers in Birmingham, Alabama proposed the plan to develop a demonstration project
to evaluate certain health care services provided by area hospitals. The project called for the hospitals to submit data about
the clinical effectiveness and the cost of three types of health
care services. The information will be collected by an independent corporation and evaluated. See Justice Department
Won't Challenge Health Care Demonstration Project, 3
HEALTH L. REP. 831, 831 (1994).
29 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101, "The mere presence of some state
involvement or monitoring does not suffice .... The active
supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state officials have and exercise power to review particular
anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those
that fail to accord with state policy. Absent such a program of
supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's
anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than
merely the party's individual interests." licor, 112 S. Ct. at
2176-77. "Actual state involvement ... is the precondition
for immunity from federal law." Id. at 2179. "The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a
decision by the State .... In the absence of active supervision in fact, there can be no state-action immunity for what
were otherwise private price fixing arrangements." Id.
20 licor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177 ("Immunity is conferred out of respect for ongoing regulation by the State, not out of respect
for the economics of price restraint").
'3' Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2176.
'32
133

Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
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134 71cor,
'3.

112 S. Ct. at 2177.

The statutory requirements for ongoing, active supervision
vary significantly. In Colorado, annual reports are required
by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2708 (West 1994); in
Florida, agency review is required every two years by FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.606(3) (West 1995); in Georgia, there are
no supervision provisions; in Idaho, the attorney general may
request updates by IDAHO CODE § 39-4903(8) (1995) and is
required to supervise by § 39-4903(10); in Kansas, annual
review by the health department is not required by KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4958 (1994); in Maine, there are no supervision
provisions; in Minnesota, the health department supervises
the agreements by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2920 (West 1995);
in Montana, there are no supervision provisions; in Nebraska,
annual reports are required by NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7708
(1994); in New York, there are no supervision provisions; in
North Carolina, periodic reports with specified information
are required by N.C. GEN.

STAT.

Estimates for 1995 are that 30% of the private group market
will be in HMOs, 35% in PPOs and POSs, 30% in managed
fee-for-service, and only 5% in unmanaged fee-for-service.
See Shields et al., The Cost ofLegislativeRestrictionson Contracting Practices: The Cost to Government, Employers and
Families, supra note 46, at 9-10.
See Zwanziger et al., CaliforniaHospitals,1980-1990, supra
note 28, at 125; Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting
Standards, supra note 43, at 442-43.
142 Entin et al., supra note 1, at 122-138.
"'3

'

§ 131 E- 192.9 (1994); in North

Dakota, there are no supervision provisions; in Ohio, the health
department may request updates by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3727.22(D) (Baldwin 1995); in Oregon, annual reports are
required by OR. REV. STAT. § 442.725 (1994); in Tennessee,
the attorney general is entrusted with oversight without further specification byTENN. CODE ANN. § 68-I1 - 1303(b) (1994);

'"0

See supra note 48. HMO enrollment in 1993 reached more
than 45 million while PPO enrollment reached 76.6 million;
in 1987, enrollment was 29.3 million and 12.2 million, respectively. See Barbara Weiss, Managed Care: There's No
Stopping It Now, 72 MED. EcON. 26, 26 (March 13, 1995).
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See Ron Winslow, Welfare Recipients Are a Hot Commodity
in Managed Care Now, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 12,
1995, at Al. See also George Anders & Laurie McGinley,
Managed Eldercare: HMOs Are Signing Up New Class of
Member: The Group in Medicare,
NAL,

THE WALL STREET JOUR-

April 27, 1995, at Al.

"Patient deaths are 8% lower and hospital costs are 11.5 percent lower than expected in cities with a high penetration of
managed care, the survey of 1,300 U.S. hospitals showed."
See KPMG Peat Marwick, KPMG Study: ManagedCareMay
Be Beneficial to Your Health and Your Pocketbook, (1993).
(for copies phone Debbie Dalmand at 7141850-4440). See also
Mumtaz A. Siddiqui et al., Insurance-RelatedDifferences in

in Texas, documents may be requested by TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(b) (West 1995); in Washington,
annual reports are required by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

43.72.310(6) (West 1995); in Wisconsin, there are no supervision provisions; and in Wyoming, annual reports are required by Wyo. STAT. § 35-24-114(b) (I 995).The Kansas and
Washington statutes, which are limited to rural areas, have
no supervision requirement.
'3 See 7icor, 112 S. Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
2182, 2183-84 (dissents).
131 For example, are the savings being passed onto consumers?
If those savings are being used for cross-subsidization, what
priorities are being pursued? Presumably, the supervisory
state agency would have to review and adopt as its own the
targets of cross-subsidization to satisfy the active supervision requirement.
'31The agencies do not promise to respond in any specified time
period to requests which involve mergers outside the safety
zone. Rather the agencies promise to respond within 120 days
to requests regarding multiprovider networks. For other situations they promise to respond within 90 days. See U.S. Dept.
of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements ofEnforcement Policy andAnalytical Principles Relating to Health Care
and Antitrust, (Sept. 7, 1994), supra note 14.
,19See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.

See supra note 57 (listing studies). See also Robert H. Miller
& Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994).

the Risk of Ruptured Appendix, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332

"4'

'4

(1995) (showing patients with HMO coverage had fewer ruptured appendixes than patients with fee-for-service coverage);
Arnold S. Relman, Medical Insurance and Health, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 471 (1994).
See generallyWholey, Feldman & Christiansen, The Effect of
Market Structure on HMO Premiums, supra note 122.
See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, COST SHIFTING IN HEALTH CARE:
SEPARATING EVIDENCE FROM RHETORIC (1994) (questioning costshifting as a long-term strategy); Charles E. Phelps, CrossSubsidies and Charge Shifting in American Hospitals, in
UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

108 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1, at 14981501.
149 Id.
' See supra text accompanying notes 102, 103, 107-111 (summarizing Tennessee's benefits and disadvantages, which are
representative of those of other statutes).
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note I, at 1501.
52See Feldman, Huge Health Care Mergers Bode Ill, supra note
122.
1-3 Two Boston Hospitals Merge to Reduce Costs, Overcapacity,
2 Health L. Rep. 1647 (1993).
'4"

Volume 8, number 3

